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 “In the Public Interest”: 
Understanding the Special Role of  
the Government Lawyer 
Patrick J. Monahan* 
The concept of the “public interest” is the foundational principle that 
guides and structures the special role of government lawyers. This public 
interest role is derived from a number of constitutional and statutory 
sources but, in Ontario, it finds its foundation in section 5(b) of the 
Ministry of the Attorney General Act,1 which provides that the Attorney 
“shall see that the administration of public affairs is in accordance with 
the law”. This responsibility to uphold and advance the rule of law falls 
not just to the Attorney but to all government lawyers who act on his or 
her behalf.  
What does this mean in practical terms for government lawyers on a 
day-to-day basis? In my view, there are three principles that must serve as 
touchstones in the fulfilment of our public interest role, namely: 
(i) independence; (ii) a commitment to principled decision-making; and 
(iii) accountability. In this paper I elaborate the significance and 
implications of each of these fundamental principles. I also consider 
whether, in light of the public interest role of government lawyers, we 
should be held to a higher or different standard of professional 
responsibility. Finally, I explain why I believe that solicitor-client privilege 
plays a critical enabling role in the fulfilment of our responsibilities. 
                                                                                                             
* Deputy Attorney General of Ontario. This is a revised draft of a paper presented at a 
meeting of the Public Law section of the Ontario Bar Association in March 2013. The views 
expressed are those of the author alone and should not be attributed to the Ministry of the Attorney 
General or the Government of Ontario. Without implication, I am grateful to a number of my 
colleagues in the Ministry of the Attorney General, namely, James Cornish, Raj Dhir, Howard 
Leibovich, Tom McKinley and Malliha Wilson, as well as former Deputy Murray Segal, for their 
helpful comments on an earlier draft of this paper. 
1 R.S.O. 1990, c. M.17. 
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I. INDEPENDENCE 
The concept of independence has long been understood to be a 
central feature of the Attorney General’s role, particularly in relation to 
decision-making in criminal matters. Crown counsel, as agents of the 
Attorney General, share the Attorney’s independence from partisan 
political influence.  
The role of Crown counsel in the criminal law realm has rightly been 
described as that of a “Minister of Justice” with a duty to ensure that the 
criminal justice system operates fairly to all: the accused, victims of 
crime and the public. Perhaps the most well-known description of this 
pivotal role is that offered by Rand J. in R. v. Boucher:  
... Counsel have a duty to see that all available legal proof of the facts is 
presented: it should be done firmly and pressed to its legitimate strength 
but it must also be done fairly. The role of prosecutor excludes any 
notion of winning or losing; his function is a matter of public duty than 
which in civil life there can be none charged with greater personal 
responsibility. It is to be performed with an ingrained sense of the 
dignity, the seriousness and justness of judicial proceedings.2 
More recently, the Supreme Court of Canada has held that the 
independence of the Attorney General is so fundamental to the integrity 
and efficiency of the criminal justice system that it is constitutionally 
entrenched.3 This constitutionally mandated independence means not just 
that the Attorney must act independently of political pressures from 
government but also that the Crown’s exercise of prosecutorial discretion 
is beyond the reach of judicial review, subject only to the doctrine of 
abuse of process. As the Court explained in Krieger, this independence is 
a hallmark of the free society:  
It is a constitutional principle in this country that the Attorney General 
must act independently of partisan concerns when supervising 
prosecutorial decisions…The quasi- judicial function of the Attorney 
General cannot be subjected to interference from parties who are not as 
competent to consider the various factors involved in making a decision 
to prosecute. To subject such decisions to political interference, or to 
judicial supervision, could erode the integrity of our system of 
                                                                                                             
2 [1954] S.C.J. No. 54, [1955] S.C.R. 16, at 23-24 (S.C.C.). 
3 Miazga v. Kvello Estate, [2009] S.C.J. No. 51, [2009] 3 S.C.R. 339, at para. 46 (S.C.C.), 
per Charron J. 
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prosecution. Clearly drawn constitutional lines are necessary in areas 
subject to such grave potential conflict.4 
The obligation to act in an independent and impartial manner, inde-
pendently of partisan political considerations, is not limited to 
government lawyers acting in relation to criminal law matters. It is a re-
sponsibility shared in common by all government lawyers who are 
expected to conduct litigation and offer legal advice on the basis of an 
independent and principled analysis of what the law requires, even when 
that advice may be inconsistent with the policy aims of the government 
of the day.  
This public interest role was aptly captured some years ago by then-
Deputy Attorney General of Canada John Tait, who underscored the duty 
of objectivity and impartiality that must guide the public service lawyer 
in the performance of his or her role:  
The duty to promote and uphold the rule of law means that there is a 
quality of objectivity in the interpretation of the law that is important to 
the public service lawyer. There must be a fair inquiry into what the 
law actually is. The rule of law is not protected by unduly stretching the 
interpretation to fit the client’s wishes. And it is not protected by giving 
one interpretation to one department and another to another 
department.5  
A similar philosophy guides the Office of the Legal Counsel 
(“OLC”) in the United States which, by delegation, exercises the Attor-
ney General’s authority under the Judiciary Act of 17896 to provide the 
President and executive agencies with advice on questions of law. In per-
forming this function, the OLC assists the President in fulfilling his 
constitutional duty to defend the Constitution and to “take Care that the 
Laws be faithfully executed”. To this end, OLC lawyers are instructed to 
provide candid, independent and principled advice, even when that ad-
vice is inconsistent with the aims of policymakers: 
OLC must provide advice based on its best understanding of what the 
law requires — not simply an advocate’s defence of the contemplated 
action or position proposed by an agency or the Administration. Thus, 
in rendering legal advice, OLC seeks to provide an accurate and honest 
                                                                                                             
4 Krieger v. Law Society of Alberta, [2002] S.C.J. No. 45, [2002] 3 S.C.R. 372 (S.C.C.) 
[hereinafter “Krieger”].  
5 John Tait, “The Public Service Lawyer, Service to the Client and the Rule of Law” 
(1997) 23 Commonwealth L. Bull. 542, at 543-44. 
6 Chapter 20, 1 Stat. 73. 
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appraisal of applicable law, even if that appraisal will constrain the 
Administration’s or an agency’s pursuit of desired practices or policy 
objectives. This practice is critically important to the Office’s effective 
performance of its assigned role, particularly because it is frequently 
asked to opine on issues of first impression that are unlikely to be 
resolved by the courts — a circumstance in which OLC’s advice may 
effectively be the final word on the controlling law.7  
Of course, the OLC also has a responsibility to facilitate the work of 
the President and the Executive Branch. Thus, in instances where it con-
cludes that a particular course of action would be unlawful, it considers 
and, where appropriate, recommends lawful alternatives that would 
achieve the policy objectives of the relevant decision-maker. At the same 
time, its legal analysis must always be “principled, forthright, as thor-
ough as time permits, and not designed merely to advance the policy 
preferences of the President or other officials”.8 
II. PRINCIPLED AND CONSISTENT DECISION-MAKING 
The commitment to independence and objectivity on the part of 
government lawyers requires, by implication, that their actions and 
advice be based on a principled and consistent view of what law requires 
in a particular situation.9 This adherence to principled consistency 
ensures that high quality legal advice is provided across government.  
On the civil side, the Ontario government is organized so that all 
lawyers have a direct relationship to the Attorney General, even though 
many of them are seconded to ministries.10 This direct relationship means 
that all government lawyers are aware of their legal responsibility to pro-
vide advice that is thorough, balanced and principled. In recent years, the 
Legal Services Division of the Ministry was reorganized in order to 
strengthen the linkages between the seconded legal branches in the vari-
ous Ministries of the government and the Ministry of the Attorney 
General, as well as to provide greater consistency in the delivery of legal 
                                                                                                             
7 See Office of the Assistant Attorney General, “Best Practices for OLC Legal Advice and 
Written Opinions” (U.S. Department of Justice, Office of Legal Counsel), July 10, 2010, at 1.  
8 Id., at 2. 
9 See the Honourable Ian Scott, “Law Policy and the Role of the Attorney General” (1989) 
39 U.T.L.J. 109, at 112-15. 
10 See Mark Freiman, “Convergence of Law and Policy and the Role of the Attorney 
General” (2002) 16 S.C.L.R. (2d) 335, at 338. 
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advice on civil law matters.11 This more coherent form of organization 
ensures that legal advice is consistent, both horizontally across govern-
ment and over time, and that the specialized expertise that each lawyer 
brings to bear is channelled into one legal voice. As Wilson, Wong and 
Hille explain: 
[T]his [centralized] structure makes clearer that the role of counsel 
situated in other ministries is not to advocate on behalf of individual 
ministries. Whether a lawyer works within a legal branch in the 
Ministry of the Attorney General or in another Ministry, the obligation 
of all government lawyers is the same: to provide objective legal advice 
to our common client, the Crown.12  
On the criminal law side, the Attorney General’s responsibilities with 
respect to criminal prosecutions are carried out by Crown counsel, who 
deal with the hundreds of thousands of criminal cases which flow 
through the courts every year in Ontario. Given this volume of cases, as 
well as the desire to avoid the potential for suggestions of political influ-
ence, it would be imprudent and impractical for the Attorney General to 
become involved in individual cases on a routine basis. The common 
practice is for the Attorney General to grant broad areas of discretion in 
criminal prosecutions to Crown counsel, except in those few circum-
stances where the Criminal Code13 requires the Attorney General’s 
personal involvement or consent. This grant of decision-making latitude 
reflects respect for the professional judgment of Crown counsel.14 
Consistency and principled decision-making is ensured in the ad-
ministration of criminal justice through an internal reporting structure, 
where all Crown counsel report upward through a chain of responsibility 
that leads to the Assistant Deputy Attorney General for Criminal Law, the 
Deputy and the Attorney General. Consistency is also achieved through 
the Crown Policy Manual which communicates the Attorney General’s 
guidance, in important areas of Crown practice and discretion, to Crown 
                                                                                                             
11 See Malliha Wilson, Taia Wong & Kevin Hille, “Professionalism and the Public Interest” 
(2011) 38 Adv. Q. 1, at 8-10 [hereinafter “Wilson et al.”]. Under the 2007 changes, the Legal 
Services Division of the Ministry was restructured into Portfolios, each led by a Portfolio Director, 
who ultimately report to the Assistant Deputy Attorney General for the Division. The Ministry’s 
legal branches now report to these Portfolio Directors, which ensures more effective Ministry 
oversight and consistency in the work of the legal branches.  
12 Id., at 10. 
13 R.S.C. 1985, c. C-46. 
14 See generally the Crown Policy Manual 2005, “Preamble”, online: <http://www.attorney 
general.jus.gov.on.ca/english/about/pubs/default.asp#CPM>. 
48 SUPREME COURT LAW REVIEW (2013), 63 S.C.L.R. (2d) 
counsel. The Crown Policy Manual is supplemented from time to time by 
Practice Memoranda issued by the Assistant Deputy Attorney General for 
Criminal Law, who has a duty to ensure that practice of the Division is 
consistent and in keeping with the Crown Policy Manual.15  
Of course, legal advice within government must reflect changes in 
the law and the broader social context, and be updated and revised to 
take account of legislative change, judicial decisions and legally relevant 
social change. But the Ministry values consistency over time in its legal 
analysis. To the extent that the Ministry’s legal advice on a question of 
law evolves, this is done in accordance with a formal process, requiring 
approval by the relevant Assistant Deputy Attorney General and, depend-
ing on the circumstances, either the Deputy or the Attorney General.  
III. ACCOUNTABILITY 
The Attorney General is accountable to the legislature and, ulti-
mately, the public for the manner in which justice is administered in the 
province. This accountability flows through to each legal counsel within 
the Ministry, through the internal reporting structures described above. 
An important goal of accountability is to maintain public confidence 
in the independent and impartial administration of justice. It is particu-
larly critical that the public understand that criminal prosecutions are 
conducted independently and free of partisan political influences. Thus, it 
is common practice for Crown counsel to set forth on the record in open 
court the reasons for proceeding, or not proceeding, with particular 
criminal prosecutions.  
Another important aspect of accountability is what might be termed 
“systemic accountability”, namely, accounting to the public for the 
accessibility, timeliness and effectiveness of the administration of justice in 
the province, coupled with initiatives designed to achieve needed 
improvements. One important example of this systemic accountability is 
the Justice on Target (“JOT”) initiative commenced by Attorney General 
Chris Bentley in 2008 and carried forward by his successor, Attorney John 
Gerretson. JOT is a province-wide initiative involving the Ministry, the 
judiciary and the legal profession, aimed at reducing delay and inefficiency 
in the criminal justice system.16 It was prompted by the recognition that 
                                                                                                             
15 Only Practice Memoranda that have policy implications are vetted and approved by the 
Attorney General. 
16 See <http://www.attorneygeneral.jus.gov.on.ca/english/jot>. 
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over the past decades, the number of appearances as well as the time 
required to deal with criminal matters have increased significantly.  
Through JOT, utilizing a partnership approach involving all the par-
ticipants in the justice system, targets have now been established for the 
number of appearances and amount of time that should be required to 
deal with various categories of criminal proceedings. Moreover, public 
reporting on progress made in achieving these targets is now available 
through the publication of relevant statistics on the Ministry website. 
Through leadership at the local as well as provincial level, important 
progress has been made in reducing delay and ultimately providing better 
service to the public. 
IV. GOVERNMENT LAWYERS AND PROFESSIONAL RESPONSIBILITY 
Some authors have suggested that the public interest role of 
government lawyers means that we should be subject to a different, and 
higher, standard of professional responsibility. For example, Adam Dodek 
has argued that, because government lawyers “exercise state power in 
everything they do”, it is appropriate that we be subject to higher ethical 
standards than the profession generally.17 He points to the legal advice 
provided by the OLC to U.S. President George W. Bush with respect to the 
legality of the use of “enhanced interrogation techniques” on suspected 
terrorists as an example of the (inappropriate) exercise of state power by 
lawyers within government.18  
Most legal commentators have concluded that the so-called “torture 
memos” failed to exhibit the thorough, candid and objective advice gen-
erally expected of OLC legal opinions. But did the failure to meet this 
high standard constitute an act of professional misconduct deserving of 
sanction by the relevant state bar association? 
                                                                                                             
17 See A. Dodek, “Lawyering at the intersection of Public Law and Legal Ethics: Government 
Lawyers as Custodians of the Rule of Law” (2010) 33 Dal. L.J. 1, at 27 [hereinafter “Dodek”]. For a 
contrary view (arguing that government lawyers have essentially the same professional obligations as 
do those practising in the private sector) see Alan C. Hutchinson, “‘In the Public Interest’: The 
Responsibilities and Rights of Government Lawyers” (2008) 46 Osgoode Hall L.J. 105, at 121-22; 
Wilson et al., supra, note 11. 
18 Dodek, id., at 24. These so-called “torture memos” generated a storm of controversy, 
with critics of these legal opinions arguing that government lawyers used the law not as a constraint 
on state power but as the “handmaiden of unconscionable abuse”. See David Cole, ed., The Torture 
Memos (New York and London: The Free Press, 2009), at 13. See also David Luban, Legal Ethics 
and Human Dignity (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2007), at c. 6 and Robert Vischer, 
“Legal Advice as Moral Perspective” (2006) 19 Geo. J. Legal Ethics 225. 
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In fact, this very question was carefully considered by the Depart-
ment of Justice in response to a 2009 memorandum from the Office of 
Professional Responsibility (“OPR”)19 which had found that the authors 
of the torture memos had indeed engaged in professional misconduct.20 
The OPR recommended that its findings of misconduct on the part of 
these attorneys be referred to the state bar disciplinary authorities in the 
jurisdictions where the memos’ authors were members.  
However Associate Deputy Attorney General David Margolis, in a 
memorandum to the Attorney General reviewing the OPR Report, re-
jected the conclusion that the authors of the torture memos had engaged 
in professional misconduct.21 In Deputy Margolis’ view, there is a fun-
damental difference between the internal standards expected of attorneys 
within the OLC and those professional standards applicable to them in 
their capacity as members of a state bar. He agreed that the Department 
of Justice expects its attorneys to provide thorough, objective and candid 
legal advice and, further, that the “torture memos” fell short of this high 
standard of candour and objectivity. But Deputy Margolis concluded that 
it was inappropriate to conclude that failure to meet this high internal 
government standard constituted a breach of the less stringent minimal 
requirements established by the state bar Rules of Professional Miscon-
duct. In Margolis’ view, the OPR’s finding that there was professional 
misconduct by the authors of the torture memos was based on “an ana-
lytical standard that reflects the Department’s high expectations of its 
OLC attorneys rather than the somewhat lower standards imposed by 
applicable Rules of Professional Misconduct”.22  
Canadian courts have clearly held that government lawyers are sub-
ject to the same standards of professional conduct as lawyers generally. 
In the words of the Ontario Divisional Court in Everingham v. Ontario:  
It is one thing to say that a particular branch of the Crown law office or 
a particular law firm or lawyer has earned a reputation for a high 
                                                                                                             
19 The Office of Professional Responsibility is responsible for investigating allegations of 
professional misconduct involving attorneys within the Department of Justice. See generally 
<http://www.justice.gov/opr>. 
20 See Department of Justice, Office of Professional Responsibility, Investigation into the 
Office of Legal Counsel’s Memoranda Concerning Issues Relating to the Central Intelligence 
Agency’s Use of “Enhanced Interrogation Techniques” on Suspected Terrorists (July 29, 2009). 
21 See D. Margolis, “Memorandum of Decision Regarding the Objections to the Findings of 
Professional Misconduct in the Office of Professional Responsibility’s Report on Investigation into 
the Office of Legal Counsel’s Memoranda Concerning Issues Relating to the Central Intelligence 
Agency’s Use of “Enhanced Interrogation Techniques” on Suspected Terrorists” (January 5, 2010). 
22 Id., at 68. 
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standard of professional conduct. It is quite different to say that any 
lawyer or group of lawyers is subject to a higher standard of liability 
than that required of every lawyer under the Rules of Professional 
Conduct. 
In respect of their liability under the Rules of Professional Conduct, 
as opposed to the public interest duties associated with their office, 
Crown counsel stand on exactly the same footing as every member of 
the Bar.  
It is therefore an error of law to exact from government lawyers a 
higher standard under the Rules of Professional Conduct than that 
required of lawyers in private practice.23  
More recently, a similar approach was adopted by the Supreme Court 
of Canada in Krieger.24 At issue here was whether the Law Society of 
Alberta had jurisdiction to discipline Crown prosecutors for failing to 
meet professional ethical standards. The Supreme Court of Canada held 
that the Law Society did possess such disciplinary jurisdiction, but noted 
that there is a clear distinction between the ethical standards set by the 
Attorney General for Crown prosecutors and those of the Law Society. 
Justices Iacobucci and Major, on behalf of a unanimous Supreme Court, 
noted that “[i]t may be that in some instances the conduct required by the 
Attorney General to retain employment will exceed the standards of the 
Law Society but of necessity that conduct will never be lower than that 
required by the Law Society”.25 Justices Iacobucci and Major concluded 
as follows: 
An inquiry by the Attorney General into whether a prosecutor has 
failed to meet departmental standards and should be removed from a 
case may involve different considerations, standards and/or procedures 
than an inquiry by the Law Society into whether the prosecutor has 
breached the rules of ethics warranting sanction. The Attorney General 
is responsible for determining the policies of the Crown prosecutors. 
The Law Society is responsible for enforcing the ethical standards 
required of lawyers. Certain aspects of a prosecutor’s conduct may 
trigger a review by the Attorney General and other aspects, usually 
ethical conduct considerations, may mean a review by the Law Society. 
                                                                                                             
23 [1992] O.J. No. 304, 8 O.R. (3d) 121, at paras. 20-22 (Ont. Div. Ct.). 
24 Supra, note 4. 
25 Id., at para. 50. For example, courts have from time to time commented on the special 
traditions and expectations of civility associated with the Crown’s role, and the need for Crown 
counsel to avoid demeaning or inflammatory language: see R. v. L. (L.), [2009] O.J. No. 2029, 
96 O.R. (3d) 412, at paras. 55-72 (Ont. C.A.).  
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A prosecutor whose conduct so contravenes professional ethical 
standards that the public would be best served by preventing him or her 
from practicing law in any capacity in the province should not be 
immune from disbarment.26 
Government lawyers must also understand and respect the proper 
limits of their professional role within government. When government 
action is challenged, the fundamental question for the lawyer is whether 
the impugned action is or is not in accordance with law. Thus, for exam-
ple, the government lawyer does not decide whether to forgo an 
otherwise valid defence for impugned government action on the basis 
that the defence in question is “technical” in nature or one that, in the 
lawyer’s view, is somehow unconnected with the “true merits” of the 
claim. Any such independent assessment by the government lawyer 
would involve an improper substitution of the lawyer’s judgment of what 
the public interest requires for that of elected and democratically ac-
countable government decision-makers. As Wilson, Wong and Hille 
conclude: 
In a democratic, post-Charter society, government lawyers cannot 
decide what constitutes the public interest and enforce the rule of law 
themselves by pre-emptively acting inconsistently with the legitimate 
goals of a democratically-elected government … The suggestion that 
government lawyers owe higher ethical duties because they exercise 
public power therefore collapses the roles of government lawyer and 
Attorney General, when in fact constitutional norms, the institutional 
hierarchy of government and democratic ideals require their separation. 
The government lawyer’s job is fundamentally to give the best legal 
advice about what is required by the rule of law.27  
V. GOVERNMENT LAWYERS AND SOLICITOR-CLIENT PRIVILEGE 
The courts have clearly and unequivocally held that solicitor-client 
privilege applies to the legal advice provided by government lawyers to 
their clients within government or in other public settings.28 The privi-
lege has the same “near absolute” quality in the public sector as has been 
recognized in private contexts. Thus in the recent Ontario v. Criminal 
                                                                                                             
26 Id., at para. 58. 
27 Wilson et al., supra, note 11, at 18-19. 
28 R. v. Campbell, [1999] S.C.J. No. 16, [1999] 1 S.C.R. 565, at para. 49 (S.C.C.). 
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Lawyers’ Assn.,29 the Supreme Court upheld provisions in Ontario’s free-
dom of information legislation which exempted from disclosure records 
that are subject to solicitor-client privilege. The Court also upheld the 
fact that a government decision not to disclose such privileged records 
need not be justified in accordance with a “public interest” test, since the 
protection of solicitor-client privilege is itself demonstrably in the public 
interest.  
Recently, however, some commentators have argued that the privi-
lege should be limited in its application to government or other public 
sector entities. Particularly notable is the recent paper by Professor  
Dodek who reconceives of the privilege as extending only to individuals 
(and only in the criminal context), which would mean that organizations, 
including governments, would no longer be entitled to claim the benefits 
of the privilege.30  
In my view, however, solicitor-client privilege is a key legal rule that 
enables government lawyers to fulfil their public interest role. In fact, its 
elimination would seriously undermine the ability of government lawyers 
to fulfil their duty of ensuring that government actions are in accordance 
with law.  
As I have argued above, government lawyers have an obligation to 
provide candid, thorough and objective legal advice to their clients 
within government, even when such advice might be at odds with the 
policy objectives of a particular government. The provision of such thor-
ough and objective advice is in fact essential to government officials who 
wish to ensure that their actions are in accordance with the rule of law. 
The fact that privilege attaches to the opinions provided by their legal 
advisors encourages and facilitates the seeking of such advice by gov-
ernment decision-makers in a timely way. It also enables such advice to 
be developed in a consistent and principled fashion, in accordance with 
strict standards for review and approval, thus enabling a single, authorita-
tive source of legal advice within government. In short, solicitor-client 
privilege within government reinforces and advances respect for the rule 
of law in the administration of public affairs.  
                                                                                                             
29 Ontario (Public Safety and Security) v. Criminal Lawyers’ Assn., [2010] S.C.J. No. 23, 
[2010] 1 S.C.R. 815, at paras. 53-56 (S.C.C.). 
30 A. Dodek, “Reconceiving Solicitor Client Privilege” (2010) 35 Queen’s L.J. 493. See 
also Liam Brown, “The Justification of Legal Professional Privilege When the Client Is the State” 
(2010) 84 Aus. L.J. 624. 
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The connection between solicitor-client privilege and the rule of law, 
implicit in many of the discussions on the issue, was explicitly recog-
nized by the House of Lords in Three Rivers in the following terms: 
[T]he seeking and giving of [legal] advice so that the clients may achieve 
an orderly arrangement of their affairs is strongly in the public interest … 
[I]t is necessary in our society, a society in which the restraining and 
controlling framework is built upon a belief in the rule of law, that 
communications between clients and lawyers, whereby the clients are 
hoping for the assistance of the lawyers’ legal skills in the management 
of their (the clients’) affairs, should be secure against the possibility of 
any scrutiny from others, whether the police, the executive, business 
competitors, inquisitive busy-bodies or any else (see also paras. 15.8 to 
15.10 of Adrian Zuckerman’s Civil Procedure where the author refers to 
the rationale underlying legal advice privilege as “the rule of law 
rationale”). I, for my part, subscribe to this idea. It justifies, in my 
opinion, the retention of legal advice privilege in our law, 
notwithstanding that as a result cases may sometimes have to be decided 
in ignorance of the relevant probative material.31 
If solicitor-client privilege were to be eliminated or qualified in 
relation to the advice provided by lawyers within government to their 
clients, these important rule of law principles would be undermined. 
Government decision-makers would become reluctant to seek timely 
legal advice, or might request such advice be provided orally rather than 
in writing. Legal advisors themselves would become reluctant to frame 
their advice with the same degree of candour and objectivity for fear that 
such advice would be made public and cause embarrassment to their 
clients. The result would be to make it significantly more difficult and 
challenging to protect the rule of law within government. I conclude that, 
however well intentioned, it would be inappropriate and unwise to 
eliminate the full force and application of solicitor-client privilege within 
government.  
VI. CONCLUSION 
Government lawyers have a special role to play in the administration 
of justice. Their client is the Crown and their overarching responsibility 
is to advance the public interest. This provides government lawyers with 
                                                                                                             
31 Three Rivers District Council v. Governor and Company of the Bank of England, [2004] 
UKHL 48, [2004] 3 W.L.R. 1274, at para. 34 (H.L.), per Lord Scott of Foscote. 
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a broader and more complex mandate than private sector counsel, since 
lawyers in government are not obliged to serve the particular interests of 
a private client. At the same time, government lawyers are constrained by 
the need to provide pragmatic as well as principled advice, advice that 
addresses in a practical way the realities and exigencies facing their cli-
ents within government. Moreover, there are clear lines of accountability 
between all government lawyers and the Attorney General who, as Chief 
Law Officer of the Crown, must answer to the legislature and ultimately 
the public for the legal conduct of the government.  
Government lawyers have been described by one commentator as “the 
keeper’s of the Crown’s conscience”.32 This description seems extravagant 
since, as discussed above, government lawyers do not have an open-ended 
mandate to pronounce on the morality or wisdom of proposed government 
action. Still, government lawyers do have an important responsibility to 
advocate for, and defend, values of legality and the rule of law within 
government. The fact that their advice to government is protected by 
solicitor client privilege is essential if they are to fulfil this critical role 
effectively. It is therefore important that this privilege continue to be 
recognized and protected by the courts, and understood by the public on 
whose behalf government lawyers ultimately serve.  
                                                                                                             
32 See Duncan Webb, “Keeping the Crown’s Conscience: A Theory of Lawyering for the 
Public Sector” (2007) 5 N.Z.J.P.I.L. 243, at 259.  

